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ABSTRACT 
Managing IT-related security incidents are a growing important issue facing the organizations in IT 
security risk management. We have used design science approach to develop an artifact to measure 
different organizations capabilities and maturity to handle IT-related security incidents. In this paper, 
we present how we have tested and will test the artifact on several different Swedish organizations. 
The participating organizations come from both the private and public sectors and all organizations 
handle critical infrastructure which can be damaged if an IT-related security incident occurs. 
Organizations had the opportunity to evaluating the actual model itself but also to test the model by 
calculating the organization's escalation capability using a query package for self-assessment. In this 
paper, we present the results of the self-assessment which indicate an overall low level of maturity in 
Sweden. The most remarkable result was only 20% of the participating organizations in the study had 
"Knowledge and Education" maturity above the lowest levels.  
Keywords: Incident escalation, Maturity models, IT security risk management, Incident management. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Swedish National Audit office concludes in a recent report that for Government agencies 
the overall capacities to handle the consequences which can arise from serious information security 
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incidents are largely unknown. Overall risk evaluation is currently lacking and instead there is 
uncertainty how strong the protection is and which incidents have taken place (NAO 2014). Managing 
IT-related security incidents are a growing important issue facing many organizations in Sweden and 
around the world. To manage escalation of incidents, organizations need established crisis teams with 
reporting channels and related report management tools that can handle incidents that do not require 
immediate action or escalation. 
As part of a doctoral research program at the Department of Computer and Systems Sciences, 
Stockholm University we are carrying out a research projects in IT security risk management. The 
purpose of our research is providing a solution to this growing problem of managing IT related 
security incident. In our research, we have used design science approach to propose a mature model to 
be used by organizations and authorities to measure the capability to escalate IT related security 
incident both within and between organization and authorities. The advantage to use a maturity model 
is that it makes it possible to obtain a measurable result to compare and stepwise improve the 
organization capabilities. The maturity model could for example be used by organizations and 
regulators to understand where shortcomings exist and help define target and action to improve 
managing of information security. 
We have divided the rest of the paper into 4 sections. In the first section, we present different 
related works. In the second section, we describe our research plans and our maturity model for 
escalation capability. In the next section, we present the background for and the result of the study. In 
the last section, we conclude the paper with a discussion of how our model is developed and tested. 
BACKGROUND 
IT Security Risk Management 
The International Standard Organization (ISO) has established a standard for IT Security Risk 
Management; ISO/IEC 27005 (ISO 2013). The term IT Security Risk Management refers to 
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approaches and methods that lead to cost effective security solutions and countermeasures. This is 
done by a process of measuring the security risk to IT systems and assuring adequate levels of 
protection. IT Security Risk Management is a continuous process and consists of the following steps 
(i) Risk monitoring, (ii) Risk Assessment/Risk Treatment, and (iii) Risk communication. The National 
Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) has introduced a framework for Enterprise-wide Risk 
Management using three different levels or tiers where IT security risk management decisions are 
made: (i) Top management, (ii) Middle management, and (iii) Operation (NIST 2010).  
For our research we have combined the ISO and NIST frameworks. The reason for this is that 
we assert that in practice each organizational level has its own individual Risk Assessment / Risk 
Treatment, Risk Monitoring, and Risk Communication processes. Since risk management decisions 
are made at different levels in an organization it is extremely important that the communication 
between the different organizational levels function efficiently work and that there are tools that can 
measure and monitor the efficiency of communication. Management of IT-related security incident is 
an area where communications between the different levels are critical. Our escalation Maturity Model 
represents an attempt to measures and help organizations improve the communication of risk decision 
between the levels within and between organizations.  
Escalation and escalation of IT-related security incident 
The term escalation in the vernacular is used to describe how conflicts issues are handled by a 
higher level in the organization or society (Kahn 1965). We instead use the term when one level seeks 
assistance or informs a higher level about an issue it cannot handle. This means in both cases that you 
also pass the responsibility for dealing with the IT security risk to a higher level. 
When defining IT-related security incident we have used the definition from Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency (MSB): “An IT incident is an undesired and unplanned IT related incident 
affecting the security of the organization's or society's information processing and that may cause a 
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disruption of the organization's ability to conduct its operations” (MSB 2012). Examples of IT related 
incidents are disruption in software and hardware, loss of data, security vulnerabilities in products, 
external attacks, human errors in handling, interference in the operating environment, and external 
events. 
 
Figure 1. Handling of incidents 
In Figure 1, we outline how different security incidents are analyzed with help of a given 
assessment process and depending on the outcome determine if the incident should be accepted, 
resolved or escalated. There could be many reasons to escalate. One reason could be budgetary 
considerations as it could be necessary to implement new expensive countermeasures. Another 
example is that the incident is so serious that help from a higher level is needed. Escalation of an IT-
related security incident will probably lead to risk treatment of some kind. For example, if a crisis 
occurs, the organization must respond and recover from the damage the incident has caused. If the 
incident does not require immediate action, this could lead to that, in the future, new countermeasures 
to deter, prevent, and detect should be installed if similar incidents will reoccur. 
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Maturity models 
The capability maturity model was first described by Humphrey who used maturity models for 
assessing software engineering capability of contractors (Humphrey et al. 1987). ISO discuss design 
principles of maturity models. There exist two types of process categories: Basic Process set and 
Extended Process set (ISO 2008). Pöppelbuβ describes three purposes for using maturity models: (i) 
Descriptive, (ii) Prescriptive, and (iii) Comparative (Pöppelbuβ et al. 2011). The Risk IT Framework 
from ISACA presents how maturity models could be used to recognize on what maturity levels 
different IT-security risk management processes are (ISACA 2009). 
APPROACH 
Introduction 
The reason we have chosen a design science approach is that we need to develop an artifact 
where we can use different cases to validate our model. Design science research methodology consists 
of 5 steps (Vaishnavi and Kuechler 2004). First we gather information of the real-world problem. The 
next step is a tentative design. In the third step an artifact is developed. In the next step the artifact is 
evaluated with help of performance measures. In the last step the design processes are completed and 
conclusions are drawn. These steps are iterated until the real-world situation is improved. Our research 
is divided into three cycles. First we constructed the primary version which was evaluated with help of 
IT security specialist from both the private and public sector and also from the academic world. We 
made some improvement based on the evaluation. Version 2 of our model was ready late 2014 and 
was tested on different organization which is described later in this paper. In cycle 3 we will create test 
scenarios which will be used by a number of organizations with different self-evaluated maturity 
levels. A security specialist from these organizations will describe how the organization will handle 
these test scenarios judge by an independent observer, who is unaware of the organization establish 
maturity level. The result will hopefully result in enough empirical data to confirm or refute our 
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hypothesis that there a correlation between how an organization could handle an incident more 
efficient way (e.g. time to solve the problem) and higher maturity level for the organization. 
The escalation maturity model 
As ISACA’s maturity model (ISACA 2009) our model consists of a matrix with different 
maturity levels as rows and different maturity attributes as columns as shown in Figure 2. We have 
used the same five maturity levels as Humphrey (Humphrey et al 1987). We have also, as ISACA, 
added a sixth level "Non-existent". Regarding the maturity attributes, we have used ISACA's maturity 
model as a starting point but adapted the attributes around the management of IT-related security 
incidents. 
 
Figure 2. Escalation maturity model 
The escalation maturity model has 6 different maturity levels. Level 0 “Non-existent” implies 
that different processes are not applied at all. Level 1 “Initial” is when the needs for measures have 
been identified and are initiated but the processes that are applied are ad- hoc and are often 
disorganized. Level 2 “Repeatable” is when measures are established and implemented and the 
various processes follow a regular pattern. Level 3 “Defined” is when measures are defined, 
documented and accepted within the organization. Level 4 “Managed” is when processes are 
monitored and routinely updated. Level 5 “Optimized” is when processes are continuously evaluated 
and improved using various performance and effective measures tailored to the organization's goals. 
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There are also six different maturity attributes which are fairly obvious when we want to assess 
an organization's escalation capability. It goes without saying, the employees must have “Awareness” 
of IT-related security incidents. There must be a clear allocation of “Responsibilities” for IT-related 
security incidents within the organization. “Reporting” channels of IT-related security incidents must 
be clearly defined. There must exist “Polices and standards” when escalation of IT-related security 
incidents should take place. “Knowledge” requirements for the different categories of employees of 
IT-related security incidents must be defined. There must be “Procedures and tools” how escalation 
of IT-related security incidents should be managed. 
The query package. 
The designed model artifact also includes a query package. The idea is that after the 
organizations have responded to the questions in the query package, it shall it be possible to determine 
the maturity level of the different maturity attributes. The number of questions in the current version is 
37. The answer to each question (one or more) of the different maturity levels and attributes are “Yes” 
or “No”. In this version we also have the response alternative “Do not know” which we in this context 
have interpreted as a “No” answer.  
 
Figure 3. Example of questions in the query package 
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Figure 3 shows examples of questions for the different attributes and to which maturity level 
each question belongs.   
All of the maturity attributes in one maturity level must be satisfied before the next level can be 
obtained. It is important also to mention that the maturity level for various processes within one level, 
also apply for the next level. To find the current maturity level one needs take the maturity attribute 
that has the lowest value.  
THE STUDY 
Introduction 
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), together with the Department of Computer 
and Systems Sciences (DSV) at Stockholm University has conducted four seminars during April 2015. 
The participating organizations, who were invited by MSB, came from three sectors namely Trade and 
Industry, Governmental Agencies, and County Councils and Municipalities. Thirty three persons 
representing an information security function from the different organizations attended the seminars. 
The seminar was divided into two parts: (1) information classification of indicators and (2) a maturity 
model for measuring organizations escalation capability to handle IT-related security incidents. The 
first part was held by MSB. In the second part of the seminar individuals from the university presented 
the maturity model as well as the query package that was related to the model. An evaluation form 
where the participants were able to evaluate the maturity model was also presented. After the end of 
the seminar copies of the query package for self-assessment and the evaluation form were distributed 
the participants. The different organizations were expected to submit, at least the evaluation form, in a 
pre-paid letter to the university. 
The organizations that responded belong to the following sectors: Trade and Industry (7 out of 8 
possible), Governmental Agencies (4 out of possible 8), and County Councils or Municipalities (10 
out of possible 17). The number of participating organizations that submitted the evaluation form was 
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21. The organizations that also sent in the query package were 16. This paper only describes the result 
from the self-assessment that the organizations have done with help of the query package. If we look 
at the person who answered the query package came from organizations with the following 
characteristics. The organization's size, in terms of number of employees, most organizations had more 
than 250 employees. All organizations had their own IT department. The majority of the organizations 
had an IT support department. Most of the organizations had their own IT operation department. All of 
the organizations handled critical infrastructure that can be damaged if an IT-related security incident 
occurs. 
Result of the self-assessment 
16 organizations submitted the query package. Many of these organizations had used the 
opportunity to respond "Do not know" to one or more of the questions in the query package. When we 
went through the answers we decided to not include those organizations that had answered "Do not 
know" to more than 25% of the questions. We concluded that in this case the representative who 
answered the questions has so poor knowledge of the organization in question that was not relevant to 
use the rest of the answers. After this review 10 organizations remained where the majority (7 of 10) 
had responded ”Do not know” to less than 10% of the questions. In the cases where the representative 
has responded "Do not know" to a question we interpreted this as a "No" answer. The results of each 
maturity attribute from the remaining 10 organizations are presented below and are summarized in 
Figure 4. 
The result for the maturity attribute “Awareness” gives a somewhat mixed picture. One 
organization (of possible 10) did not understand the need for awareness among employees. The 
employees from 2 of the organizations seem to have at least some form of awareness of IT-related 
security incidents. For 2 of the organizations the employees also were aware how incident can affect 
the organization. Employees from 3 of the organizations also had good knowledge of different defined 
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and documented IT-related security incidents. Two organizations had continuous evaluation and 
improvement of employees’ awareness of IT-related security incidents.  
The result for the maturity attribute “Responsibility” shows that a number of organizations (4 
of possible 10) do not understand the need for accountability of IT-related security incidents. For 2 
organizations the accountability for IT-related security incidents is established and implemented and it 
is clear which responsibilities that different employees have. For 2 of the organizations the 
accountability for IT-related are defined, documented and accepted by the organizations. Two of the 
organizations have ccontinuous evaluation and improvement of the accountability for both the 
technical and administrative management of IT-related security incidents. 
The result for the maturity attribute “Reporting” shows that for the majority of the 
organizations (5 of possible 10), reporting of IT-related security incidents to the management has been 
identified and initiated. For 2 of the organizations reporting channels of IT-related security incidents 
are routine updated. For 3 of the organizations the reporting channels to the management of IT-related 
security incidents are also continuously evaluated.  
The result for the maturity attribute “Polices and standards” also gives a somewhat mixed 
picture. Two of the organizations did not understand the need for policies and standards for IT-related 
security incidents at all, while for 1 organization polices and standards is at least identified and 
implemented. For 2 of the organizations policies and standards for IT-related security incidents are 
also establish and implemented. For 2 of the organizations both technical and administrative policies 
and standards for IT-related security incidents are defined, documented and accepted by the 
organization. For 1 organization both technical and administrative policies and standards for IT-related 
security incidents are routinely updated. Two of the organizations had continuous evaluation and 
improvement of both technical and administrative policies and standards for IT-related security 
incidents. 
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The most surprising results for the different maturity attributes were “Knowledge and 
education”. A very large number of organizations (8 of possible 10) do not understand the need for 
employees’ knowledge and training on IT-related security incidents. The implication of this is that 
these organizations among other things have not identified the knowledge requirements and training of 
employees on IT-related security incidents and that education plans are not defined and documented. 
Only 1 organization knowledge requirements and education plans for employees on IT-related security 
incidents have been established and implemented. For 1 organization both technical and administrative 
knowledge requirements and education plan for employees on IT-related security incidents are 
routinely updated.  
The result for the maturity attribute “Procedures and Tools” shows that 1 organization seems 
to not understand the need for procedures and tools for management of IT-related security incidents. 
For 2 of the organizations procedures for managing IT-related security incidents have been identified 
and initiated. The majority of organizations (5 of possible 10) have procedures for managing IT-
related security incidents that have been defined, documented and accepted. For 1 organization 
procedures for managing IT-related security incidents are automated and routinely updated. For 1 
organization, these procedures are also continuously evaluated and improved.  
When the responses from the participating organizations are analyzed, it turns out that only two 
organizations have reached the total maturity level "Repeatable" respectively "Initial". All other 
organizations have only reach the overall maturity level "Non-existent". The criterion for an 
organization to reach a total maturity level is that the organization has reached that level for all 
maturity attributes. If an organization, for example, shall reach the maturity level “Defined”, all the 
individual maturity attributes, at least, must have reach the maturity level “Defined”. Because of this, 
just two organizations have reached a total maturity level that is higher than the level "Non -existent". 
The main reason is that so many organizations only have obtained the maturity level "Non-existent", 
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especially for the maturity attribute 'Knowledge and education' and the maturity attribute 
"Responsibility". 
 
Figure 4. Maturity levels for all maturity attributes 
To get an idea of the extent of actions that each organization must perform to reach the next 
maturity level, we have introduced the concept of "Alignment efforts". If an organization has 
answered "No" to a question in the query package, this will lead to that at least one action must be 
performed if the organization wishes to reach the next maturity level. We realize of course that the 
actions needed to meet the requirements that a question suggest can vary strongly but still think that 
"Alignment efforts" gives a pretty good idea of the amount of work that an organization must perform 
in order to reach the next maturity level. We define "Alignment efforts" for a specific maturity level is 
the sum of the questions with the answer "No" to all of maturity attributes of that maturity level, 
divided by the total number of questions for all maturity attributes of that maturity level. We define the 
"Total alignment efforts" to reach the highest maturity level (Optimized) as the sum of questions with 
the answer "No" for all maturity attributes, divided by the total number of questions for all maturity 
attribute. Figure 5 shows the "Alignment efforts" (Number of actions) that the organizations in the 
study must perform to reach the different maturity levels.  
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Figure 5. Alignment efforts to reach next maturity level 
CONCLUSIONS 
It appears from the study that the overall maturity to handle the consequences which can arise 
from serious information security incidents is low. However, before you can know and compare these 
levels among organizations a calibration and deepening of the questions seems to be necessary if 
organizations should be able to use the maturity model as a tool for self-assessment. Several terms also 
need to be better defined. This could be the reason that many organizations responded "Do not know" 
to many of the questions. If the respondent had more time to examine a particular factual situation the 
answer to the question may have been different. Other reasons could be that the requirement for 
different maturity attribute that the organizations should achieve could be inaccurate or unclear. The 
query package in its current state is probably more suitable in an interview situation. In parallel with 
this study some students at DSV have used to the questions in the query package when they 
interviewed two organizations in the financial sector (Wahlgren et al. 2016) and they had not the 
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slightest problem getting answers to all questions because at any ambiguities with a question they 
could provide the respondent with additional information.  
We will therefore make several changes to our maturity model, and then we will develop a web-
based tool, including a Help function, to assist organizations in the self-assessment process. The tool 
will be used by organizations to enter answers to the questions in the query packet and then 
automatically calculate the total level of maturity as well as the maturity level of the individual 
attributes. The tool will also calculate the Alignment efforts and suggest what action the organization 
could take to achieve the desired level of maturity. We will use English when we define our new 
maturity model so that it is possible to use our web-based tool internationally. To verify our new 
maturity model and the web-based tool we will use the tool on some organizations both in and outside 
Sweden. We will then continue with cycle 3 of our research where we will create a number of test 
scenarios that involve IT-related security incidents. We will select a number of organizations with 
different self-evaluated maturity levels. Then a security specialist from these organizations will 
describe how they will handle the test scenarios. The result will be judge by an independent observer. 
The result of cycle 3 will then establish the predictive ability of our maturity model. 
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